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Abstract 
The United Kingdom now has one of the most comprehensive tobacco control policies in the 
world, a far cry from its status two decades ago. Some influential public health voices have 
called for a similar campaign against alcohol consumption. But is the comparison 
appropriate? We identify the factors which were important in the relatively successful 
campaign for tobacco control, then analyse the obstacles and opportunities facing the 
movement for more stringent alcohol control. Alcohol policy today often bears a striking 
resemblance to tobacco policy pre-1990s, when the UK started on its path to becoming a 
leading regulatory on this policy. 
‘Every cigarette is doing you damage’. Irish anti-smoking slogan, adapted from Australia. 
‘There is no safe dose of alcohol’ Professor David Nutt (2011) 
Introduction: from tobacco to alcohol control? 
Tobacco and alcohol are both ‘legal addictions’ that have attracted more public policy 
attention in recent years. There is a long history of attention to the dangers of consumption of 
these products, even if it is largely a history, of frustrated reformers, especially for alcohol 
(Baggott, 2011). There is also a more specific common element to both issues in recent times: 
medical and public health groups gather scientific evidence and use it to advocate policies 
designed to reduce health hazards. In both fields, we can identify two elements of the 
‘evidence based policymaking’ (Cairney, 2014) process: the evidence generated to define a 
policy problem (unhealthy behaviour and its individual and social effects) and the policy 
proposals, such as higher taxes and stricter regulations, generated to combat it by seeking to 
minimise unhealthy behaviour.     
The main concern for public health groups is the extent to which policy solutions relate to the 
scientific evidence. They would like the policy response to correspond directly to the 
evidence on the adverse effects of tobacco and alcohol use. Yet, the evidence-policy link 
often appears to be weak (the response is not proportionate to the problem) and/or delayed (a 
proportionate response takes a long time). A policy response may take decades to develop 
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after the evidence was produced and generally accepted within the public health field. In 
some cases, it may happen long after the evidence is first accepted in government.  
Today, the size of this gap varies markedly in tobacco and alcohol; public health ideas have 
been accepted, and used to inform policy choices, in very different ways.  In tobacco, Cairney 
et al (2012) suggest that the gap between the problem and a proportionate response has been 
20-30 years. Yet, UK tobacco control policies are close to international ‘best practice’. 
Tobacco control policy is ‘comprehensive’ in the UK; it tops a major European public health 
league table (the ‘Tobacco Control Scale’) and represents a model for the rest of Europe 
(Joossens and Raw 2011; Cairney et al, 2012: 99; Levy et al.2012).  
In comparison, alcohol policies are more limited, even though alcohol has been on the 
government agenda for far longer (Greenaway, 2003). Serious debate about whether alcohol 
should be treated similarly to tobacco, through a neo-prohibitionist restrictive regime, is only 
now beginning. Comparable evidence, suggesting unequivocally that alcohol is harmful to 
health, has not been accepted within government, which has continued to pursue a ‘harm 
reduction’ regime for alcohol, as it did for tobacco until the 1990s (Berridge, 2004; Thom, 
2005). The major corresponding policy solutions – including minimum pricing and a ban on 
advertising and promotion - have not been adopted. According to the last major review, UK 
alcohol policy had a relatively ‘low policy score’ in the EU (Anderson and Baumberg, 2006: 
374). Even if the evidence to underpin a neo-prohibitionist alcohol regime became stronger, 
we might find a significant delay in the passage of policies. 
One key aspect to this process is the role of medical and public health scholarship. Numerous 
public health accounts link evidence-policy gaps, between the scientifically-identified size of 
the problem and an appropriate government response, to: (a) an initial reluctance of 
researchers to recommend specific policy responses; (b) a lack of public and governmental 
knowledge of the problem; (c) the strategies of industries, to deny the seriousness of the 
problem and lobby government to introduce limited policy responses; and/ or (d) an 
unwillingness of government to address the problem proportionately, perhaps because it fears 
a popular backlash (Cairney et al, 2012: 10-12; Oreskes and Conway, 2010). Further, public 
health scholarship is now closely linked to advocacy, that is, efforts to turn the evidence on 
harm into strong public health policy instruments.  
The most recent major alcohol-control manifesto is Health First (Bauld et al, 2013). It was 
produced under the auspices of the Alcohol Health Alliance UK which is supported by 70 
organisations, including groups focused solely on alcohol (e.g. Alcohol Concern), 
professional health groups (e.g. the British Medical Association and ten Royal Colleges of 
health professions), groups focused on cancer, heart disease, depression, liver disease, 
environmental health, men’s health, policing, and addiction, and research institutes (including 
the UK Centre for Tobacco Control Studies) and universities (2013: 4).  These groups are 
seeking ways to minimise the size of the evidence-policy gap, largely by learning from the 
tobacco policy experience, the strategies used by public health (and industry) groups in the 
past, and the scientific evidence on the policies introduced to reduce tobacco use (see Bauld 
et al. 2013: 10; 23-6; 38; British Medical Association, 2008).  
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In this article, we provide important context to this campaign-focused comparison by 
providing a framework in which to compare tobacco and alcohol control policy.  We do not 
analyse the relative merits or impacts of tobacco and alcohol control instruments. Rather, we 
explain, with reference to the political science literature on policymaking, why some 
instruments are selected (Cairney, 2012; Cairney et al, 2012; Greenaway, 2008a). We 
compare the modern history of UK tobacco and alcohol control policy to explain the adoption 
of relatively strong instruments in tobacco.  Further, to go beyond a simple comparison of the 
properties of tobacco control ideas and their supporting evidence (is the evidence simply 
more persuasive in tobacco?) we identify the links between the exercise of power and the 
adoption of policies. We identify two main issues.  
First, to understand how scientific evidence and policy solutions fare within political systems, 
we must examine the wider political contexts in which they are promoted, accepted and acted 
upon. Leading countries have moved from minimal to fully comprehensive tobacco control 
regimes in the post-World War II period (Studlar et al. 2011). In those countries, government 
choices have changed profoundly following changes in five key policy processes:  
 institutional - departments of health took the major responsibility for tobacco policy  
 agendas - tobacco was understood and addressed as a public health problem 
 networks - public health groups became dominant over producers  
 socioeconomic - taxation revenue, smoking and opposition to tobacco control fell 
 ideas - the evidence on smoking related harm was ‘set in stone’ and governments 
learned from each other about how to address the problem (Cairney et al. 2012). 
Change in these factors has been mutually reinforcing.  For example, increased acceptance of 
the scientific evidence has helped shift the way that governments understand the tobacco 
problem.  The framing of tobacco as a health problem allows health departments to take the 
policy lead.  A decrease in smoking rates reduces the barriers to tobacco control; more 
tobacco control means fewer smokers. 
Second, the evidence-policy gap might be reduced if alcohol control advocates learn from 
that experience. However, politics and policymaking varies markedly by policy issue (Lowi 
1964; Freeman 1986). Consequently, we need to examine in-depth the differences between 
the alcohol and tobacco policy contexts, and the comparability of policy instruments designed 
to control or influence healthy behaviour.  
To this end, we examine five key public policy processes to gauge the extent to which 
alcohol policy might emulate tobacco policy: the responsibility for policy decisions (which 
government department is primarily responsible for alcohol policy?);  the ways in which the 
problem can be defined (is there a clear public health frame and a sense of urgency to solve 
the problem?); the status of pressure participants (what is the balance of power between 
public health groups and the alcohol industry?); the socioeconomic context (how important is 
alcohol tax revenue to government? Does the public support further alcohol control?); and the 
ways in which the scientific evidence is interpreted (does the government accept that there is 
no safe level of consumption?) and addressed (do governments draw on international action 
or policy lessons from other countries?).  
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Tobacco and Alcohol Policy: Five Key Factors  
Has there been Institutional Change? UK Government Departments 
Health departments and organisations in the UK have taken the main responsibility for 
tobacco control, largely replacing departments focused on finance, agriculture, trade, industry 
and employment.  The Treasury now supports a taxation regime designed to reduce tobacco 
demand (Cairney et al, 2012: 114) and, in 2002, it identified smoking as the biggest cause of 
health inequalities (Cairney, 2007: 62). This shift changes some important rules of tobacco 
policymaking: health departments are the most likely to frame tobacco as a health problem 
and consult with health groups. 
Greenaway (2011: 411) describes alcohol as subject to greater fluctuations in responsibility 
according to how the issue was ‘framed’. There is the same historical sense of cross-
departmentalism in both areas but, in alcohol, non-health departments still sometimes take the 
policy lead. Before the 1950s, alcohol policy was rarely seen as a responsibility of the health 
department. A key focus was licensing law on the sale of alcohol. Further, the main pressure 
on government to act came from the ‘temperance’ movement which focused on moral and 
social obligations rather than health (Greenaway, 1998; Berridge, 2013).    
Even in the 1950s, the Ministry of Health treated alcohol consumption as a social, not a 
health problem (people were free to drink unless they engaged in anti-social behaviour), and 
even then it was reluctant to take responsibility (Greenaway, 2003: 158). It resisted, for some 
time, the argument put forward by psychiatrists (backed by work in the US and by the WHO) 
that alcoholism was a treatable ‘medical disease’ (2003: 159). Then, the disease frame took 
hold, but with the effect of limiting the target of alcohol policy to a small section of the 
population. Government concern with the ‘drinking habits of the nation’ was largely a ‘post-
1970 focus’ (2003: 165), made more complicated by the context of a growing liberal attitude 
to social behaviour. ‘By contrast, attitudes towards tobacco consumption became markedly 
more censorious’ (Greenaway 2003: 175).  
During this time, other departments took the lead (Thom, 1999: 5). For example, the Ministry 
of Transport gradually oversaw efforts to reduce ‘drunk-driving’ from the 1950s, as the 
evidence on the effect of alcohol on driver responses became increasingly accepted in 
government, the technology developed to test blood alcohol levels, and public attention rose 
(Greenaway, 2003: 167). Spending on drunk-driving campaigns was much higher than for 
health education on drinking at least until the 1980s. This imbalance in response was partly 
because of the availability of, and government receptivity to, the evidence: the medical 
interpretation of alcoholism as a disease was ‘unclear and always shifting’; the drunk-driving 
issue had largely been addressed after a surge of public concern, producing a technical debate 
about the effectiveness of policy (Greenaway 2003: 173-4; note the nomenclature shift to 
describe ‘drink-driving’ in the UK). Notably, the health department is mentioned rarely in 
Greenaway’s (2003) analysis, partly because the issues were naturally addressed by transport 
and policing departments, and partly because alcohol industry groups managed to contain the 
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issue to transport safety. This furthered a historical tendency either to minimise the role of the 
state in alcohol control, or restrict its involvement to discrete issues (Nicholls, 2009: 199). 
Thus, even by the 1970s, the UK’s health department was relatively new to alcohol, whereas 
it had been an active participant in tobacco control for some time. Its role became clearer 
from the 1970s when it accepted a ‘problem drinking’ (rather than ‘alcoholism’) frame, 
which widened its target population, and the Home Office transferred more responsibility for 
‘habitual drunken offenders’. In the late 1970s it was influenced by the ‘consumption model’, 
which linked alcohol abuse to overall levels of drinking in society, coupled with evidence of 
rising consumption in the UK from the 1950s. Policy became overseen by health ministers 
sympathetic to alcohol control, and the health department became a focal point for 
increasingly well-funded and organised (albeit from a low base) public health groups. It was 
also able to draw on its experience on tobacco control, especially in health education, taxation 
and advertising (Greenaway 2003: 177). 
Even as the health department role grew, it shared responsibility on measures such as taxation 
(Customs and Excise) and advertising (the Advertising Standards Authority) (Greenaway 
2003: 177; Baggott, 2011: 350; Baggott, 2010: 136). It does not control alcohol licensing and, 
therefore, periodically arising issues such as binge drinking (in relation to opening hours) and 
football hooliganism (Greenaway, 2003: 181; Greenaway, 2011: 417). For example, the 2003 
Licensing Act for England and Wales was led by the Home Office (before being taken over 
by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, DCMS). This came at a time (mid-2000s) 
when the Department of Health stalled on a wider Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for 
England (AHRSE) and measures such as increasing tax to reduce demand were ‘ruled out 
largely on grounds of political and bureaucratic expediency’ (Greenaway 2011: 417; 425). 
Indeed, Greenaway (2011: 418) describes the health department’s frequent reluctance to take 
the lead on alcohol, with its Health Secretary and ministerial team lukewarm to reform (and/ 
or focused on issues such as National Health Service reform or illicit drug use) and its drug 
professionals ‘reluctant to consider alcohol abuse in the same category as drug abuse’. 
AHRSE was taken up by the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, designed to tackle cross-cutting 
issues (Greenaway, 2011: 419). 
Has there been Institutional Change? The multi-level context  
In alcohol and tobacco, there has been a significant shift of policy responsibility to other 
levels and types of government: policies may be made at the devolved, UK and EU levels and 
there may be a role for the courts, as in minimum unit pricing in Scotland. However, they 
display markedly different histories: in tobacco, international action has often provided 
further impetus for control; international action on alcohol is relatively new, with the 
exception of the WHO, and there is a greater mix of actors for and against further control. 
This reflects a traditionally wide range of country level views, from Nordic patterns of 
restriction to Southern European patterns of alcohol normalisation (based partly on ‘drinking 
cultures’ and the influence of wine producers in the South) and mixed views within alcohol 
control groups, seeking either controls on alcohol use in general or alcohol abuse in particular 
(Princen, 2007: 25; 27).  
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Significant health and social policy on alcohol only arose in the EU in the mid-1990s, 
following Swedish concerns over the effect of EU membership on its alcohol controls. It 
focused on areas such as alcohol consumption and drink-driving by young people (Princen 
2007: 26). The European Commission only took steps towards an anti-alcoholism strategy in 
2005, focusing on ‘soft instruments’, including education, ‘self-regulation’ and funding 
alcohol control groups, on youth, driving and advertising. Further, there is a much longer 
history of economic-related alcohol policy in the EU, with a strong orientation towards trade 
liberalisation (Princen 2007: 25). This contrasts with tobacco policy, subject to a public 
health perspective in the EU since the mid-1980s. 
As in tobacco, there is a clearer alcohol control agenda in Scotland (Hawkins and Holden, 
2013: 58; Cairney, 2007). The Scottish Government has responsibility for health and criminal 
justice, but not economic or trade, policy. It has used these powers recently to foster a price-
based approach to reducing alcohol consumption – including a ban on sales promotions and 
the introduction of a minimum unit price for alcohol (subject to comment by the European 
Commission after consultation with member states). A similar policy has stalled at the UK 
Government level which, instead, promised to ban the sale of alcohol below the cost of its 
sales taxes (Hawkins et al, 2012: 299).  
Is the Problem Framed Differently and High on the Government Agenda?  
Smoking was once seen as normal and tobacco was once viewed primarily as a product with 
economic value; tobacco growing and manufacturing were often subsidised or encouraged.  
Now, smoking is being increasingly ‘denormalized’ and is largely viewed as a public health 
epidemic or even a moral problem (Cairney et al. 2012: 213-4).  This is the frame that many 
alcohol control groups would like to adopt. For example, Bauld et al (2013: 10) argue that: 
‘Every year in the UK, there are thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands of hospital 
admissions and over a million violent crimes linked to drinking alcohol’. They estimate the 
‘personal, social and economic cost of alcohol’ at over £60bn in the UK (2013: 6). 
Yet, for long periods of history, drunkenness has been ‘culturally acceptable’ behaviour, only 
challenged recently (Berridge, 2013: 31; 233; Nicholls, 2009: 233). The risk of ‘moderate’ or 
‘heavy’ alcohol consumption is less clear, and it still has a reputation for providing some 
health benefits if taken in small quantities (Yeomans, 2013; Greenaway, 2008a: 491). 
Further, alcohol sales are still linked strongly to the importance of tax revenue, jobs (often in 
rural areas with limited alternatives), tourism, exports and a ‘night time economy’. The 
industry blames sensational media for exaggerating its ill effects (Hawkins and Holden 2013: 
60).
i
 Further, the problematic use of alcohol is more likely to be linked to crime or anti-social 
behaviour than health; there is a different sense of public harm. Therefore, tobacco control, as 
a public health policy, appears to be more straightforward and conducive to a coherent 
abstinence-based control strategy. While the idea of ‘harm reduction’ has not disappeared (in 
fact, the invention of e-cigarettes has reignited the debate), it is less apparent than in fields 
such as illicit drugs and alcohol use.  
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In alcohol, it is more difficult to shake off the idea that public health controls would hurt the 
economy and punish people for engaging in legal behaviour - a ‘nanny state’ argument 
heeded by Conservative governments (Baggott, 2011: 351). The alcohol industry also 
promotes, generally successfully, the idea that most people drink sensibly and that 
governments should focus on ‘high risk’ or ‘problem’ drinkers rather than demonise general 
consumption (Hawkins et al, 2012: 302; Hawkins and Holden, 2013: 59; Nicholls, 2009: 216-
7).  
This understanding of the problem is crucial to the way in which it is ‘solved’ (note that, in 
political science, ‘solved’ or ‘solution’ refers to the way in which policymakers think about, 
and governments address, a problem - without implying that the choice is appropriate or the 
solution is effective). For example, a general social problem might be solved with uniform 
measures such as regulations/ bans on advertising and high prices, while a problem relating to 
individuals may be addressed with specific medical and police interventions, coupled with a 
general commitment, through education and information, to tackle a binge drinking culture in 
some social groups (although note that the Scottish Government justified its minimum unit 
price legislation as a way to deal with ‘harmful and hazardous’ drinkers – McCulloch, 2014). 
The choice of solutions also takes place in the context of continued industry influence - and 
its general industry strategy is to describe uniform and strong control measures as ‘blunt’ and/ 
or ‘unworkable’ tools, made worse by poor consultation with the industry (Hawkins and 
Holden, 2013: 55). 
The history of alcohol control is one of multiple and shifting frames used by different, 
influential actors within the policy process - including moral, ‘disease’, epidemiological, and 
criminal justice (Thom, 1999: 15-7; 96). A shift from moral/ temperance to psychiatric/ 
scientific influence began in the 1950s, when government (and much medical) attention to 
alcohol consumption as a problem was low (Thom, 1999: 49 describes one main effect: the 
development, over three decades, of ‘alcoholism treatment units’). The advent of the ‘new 
public health’ in the 1970s focusing on noncontagious, behavioural health hazards, had some 
effect (Thom 2005) and ‘preventive health’, focusing on consumption in the whole 
population eventually became a more persuasive model in the health department (Greenaway, 
2008a: 488). However, this ability to present multiple frames, and the legacy of limited 
historical control, is reflected in relatively slow change in alcohol policy.   
Starting in the 1980s, there was a shift in UK policy in alcohol but from a much lower base 
and with a less clear direction than tobacco. Alcohol was included regularly in broad public 
health strategies designed to promote the reduction of unhealthy behaviour, but the 
government was not committed to a broad socio-economic approach to alcohol control. 
Instead, it often based solutions on a specific ‘disease’ model and/or a focus on youth or other 
sub-groups (Nicholls, 2009: 217). It tended to adopt education-based measures rather than 
direct regulation. In the Conservative Government era (1979-1997) there was: a focus on 
problem individuals or groups; a broad rejection of tax, price, or other measures to reduce 
demand or availability; an emphasis on health education on the risks of drinking; a 
‘relaxation of licensing’; and, a tendency to rely on voluntary ‘industry self-regulation 
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measures on advertising and under-age drinking’ (Baggott, 2010: 137; 2005). These measures 
are similar to those in tobacco policy, 1960s-1990s. 
Baggott (2005; 2010: 140; 143) identifies some change in UK government strategy from the 
election of Labour in 1997 - including more police powers to deal with premises associated 
with under-age drinking or anti-social behaviour - but several similarities: an unwillingness to 
‘regulate price and availability’; a focus on “‘high risk’ groups rather than on the wider 
population”; and, a continuation of voluntary agreements with industry on areas such as 
advertising and health education. During this time, the replacement of ineffective voluntary 
measures with legislation was a key turning point in tobacco control (Cairney, 2007).  
The Labour government continued with the use of multiple ‘frames’ to justify alcohol 
control. According to Greenaway (2011: 413-6), the 2003 Licensing Act for England and 
Wales’ ‘muddled’ rationale was simultaneously: economic, including a driver to enhance 
urban regeneration by reducing ‘red tape’ for business and allowing town centres to remain as 
hubs for drinking; ‘progressive’, by signalling a move from ‘nanny state’ regulation towards 
policies based on encouraging a ‘continental-style’ drinking culture (reflecting a longer term 
trend towards liberalisation of licensing laws); pro-local authority, by shifting many powers 
from magistrates; and aimed at reducing public disorder, by liberalising the law on opening 
hours to address late-night disorder. Its stated rationale was to: ‘protect children from harm’; 
‘prevent public nuisance’; ‘promote public safety’; and, ‘prevent crime and disorder’. In 
either description, its public health rationale was limited – unlike in Scotland, this was not a 
stated objective (Baggott, 2010: 138-9).  
A further strategy during Gordon Brown’s tenure as Prime Minister (2007-10) was to 
introduce targets (cross-departmental, led by the Home Office) to reduce hospital admissions 
and ‘public perceptions of drunk or rowdy behaviour’ and make a broad commitment to study 
the links between ‘alcohol pricing, promotion and harm’, while the 2008 budget saw some 
commitment to raising the price of alcohol above inflation, while the government criticised 
supermarkets for artificially low prices (Baggott 2010: 144-5).  
Overall, alcohol can still be framed as an issue of disorder (via Home Office) and/ or 
economic development and tourism (via the DCMS). The UK Government’s most recent 
alcohol strategy (Cm 8386, 2012) also focuses on the anti-social consequences of ‘binge’ 
drinking. A comparison with tobacco control highlights the absence of two key policy 
measures – on advertising/ promotion and pricing – that would be associated with treating 
alcohol control as a pressing public health problem. The industry still has the ability to 
advertise alcohol - advertising expenditures vastly overshadow those spent on health 
education and, compared to tobacco, there is a relative lack of product warnings on the ill 
effects of alcohol consumption. The current UK Government has also delayed indefinitely the 
introduction of a minimum unit price on a unit of alcohol.  
Has the Balance of Power Shifted Between Participants?  1. The industry. 
The World Wars produced a very close and enduring relationship between the government 
and tobacco industry because the latter were seen as patriotic for providing a morale-boosting 
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product to the troops (Cairney et al, 2012: 48).  Policy was coordinated by finance-related 
departments, and tobacco companies were the most consulted.  In contrast, the UK 
government saw its control of alcohol use as a key to the war efforts.   
Yet, now, it seems easier to ‘demonise’ tobacco companies. In particular, there is much-
reduced support for tobacco company denials of the health hazards of smoking, epitomized in 
the testimony of tobacco company executives before a US Congressional committee in 1994, 
and exposed by the widespread release of damaging internal tobacco company documents 
(Cairney et al, 2012: 132; Studlar, 2002).  
There are some recent examples of similar criticisms of the alcohol industry (PLoS Medicine 
Editors, 2011; McCambridge et al, 2013).  However, it has not lost its ‘traditionally 
privileged and powerful position within the policy process’ (Baggott, 2010: 137).ii Alcohol 
selling companies are still well regarded and consulted regularly, even during the production 
of public health plans (Baggott, 2005: 234; Hawkins et al, 2013; Holden and Hawkins, 2012). 
Some companies are still respected for their positive contribution, particularly by departments 
focused on trade and economic growth.  
From the mid to late 2000s, Baggott (2010: 147) detects a ‘tougher stance’ and willingness of 
the UK Government to replace voluntary with statutory codes of industry practice. There is 
also a greater government willingness to consult the public as well as the industry. However, 
the routine influence of the alcohol industry has not diminished in the same way as tobacco 
companies (Cairney, 2007: 47; Baggott, 2011: 412). Instead, it has maintained ‘partnership’ 
status to ensure regular consultation with government and the chance to influence policy 
further through implementation (Hawkins et al, 2012: 301; Berridge 2005a; Baggott 2005; 
2006).  
This relationship can be identified at several levels of government. In the UK, Baggott (2010: 
136-7) describes the Labour Government’s ‘unashamedly pro-business’ social policy 
strategy, arguing that legislation to reform licensing in 2003 was prompted by industry 
demands for longer hours in pubs and off-licenses, and identifying a significant commitment 
to joint-working with the industry on the AHRSE (2010: 139). In the EU, Princen (2007: 25) 
discusses a strong orientation towards trade liberalisation, an economic frame, and a focus on 
‘problem’ drinking - allowing the industry to play a central role in consultation (Princen 
2007: 25). Even in Scotland, manufacturers and sellers have a stronger role, not only in 
consultation, albeit sometimes when a decision already has been made, but also in their 
efforts to oppose restrictive policies through the courts (Holden and Hawkins, 2012; Cairney 
and McGarvey, 2013: 167; BBC News, 2013). 
2. Public health groups and the public health strategy.  
In tobacco, public health groups are now more likely to be consulted and tobacco companies 
are often deliberately excluded. Anti-smoking groups in the UK were relatively poorly 
funded (ASH) or disorganised (the BMA) until the mid-1980s, but they have now become 
key players within government. ASH was established by the Royal College of Physicians in 
1971 and has been funded by the Department of Health (Berridge 2005a; Cairney et al, 2012: 
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103). The 1970s/80s onwards saw a major shift in public health campaigns, from harm 
reduction to neoprohibitionism, and a rise in spending on such campaigns, made more 
significant when tobacco advertising was banned (Berridge, 2004; Berridge and Loughlin, 
2005). In other words, the power of these groups has been reinforced by the growing trend 
towards absolutist tobacco control.  
In contrast, the Alcohol Health Alliance was not established until 2007 and the shift towards 
a more absolutist approach to alcohol control is in its relative infancy. Voluntary groups grew 
from the 1950s, and alcohol control groups mobilised from the 1960s and 70s, but the mix of 
groups was wider than in tobacco, reflecting a greater likelihood that alcohol policy would 
cross departmental boundaries frequently (Thom, 1999: 13-4; 67). Broad alliances contain 
more social work, policing and voluntary groups, with different goals (Baggott, 2011: 350; 
Greenaway, 1998). Until very recently, key alcohol control groups, such as the Royal College 
of Physicians, have felt like ‘new kids on the block’ and unaware of the ‘enormity’ of the 
control agenda (Greenaway 2011: 418).  
Has the Socioeconomic Context Changed Markedly?   
The socioeconomic context can be broken down into economic factors and social attitudes 
and behaviour. The economic benefit of tobacco production and consumption has fallen 
dramatically in the post-war period, making it less significant to the Treasury. Tobacco 
taxation as a proportion of total taxation has fallen from 16% in 1950 to below 4% (Cairney 
et al, 2012: 114). The number of smokers has declined markedly, from 82%/ 41% in men and 
women in 1948, to 22%/21% in 2008 (2012: 115).   Opposition to tobacco control has 
declined, and, crucially, people have become more supportive after measures were introduced 
(2012: 115-7).  
In comparison, the alcohol economy may now be more important and drinking is still a 
normal part of life, but there is not always a stronger level of opposition to further controls:  
 Total alcohol duties are now approximately the same as those for tobacco – over 
£10bn per year (Rogers, 2013) and the economic frame is geared towards the role of 
the ‘night time economy’ (Hawkins and Holden, 2012: 301).   
 Drinking prevalence is more difficult to gauge, falling into several categories: 1) did 
you drink last week? 2) Did you drink on at least 5 days last week? 3) Did you binge 
drink? The meaning of the latter is difficult to pin down (Nicholls, 2009: 234), either 
referring to a specific level, double the recommended daily amount, or an attitude 
relating to setting out to get drunk (‘moderation’ is also difficult to define – Yeomans, 
2013’ Greenaway, 2008a: 495-6). The self-reported levels in 2010 were 67/17/19% in 
men and 53/10/13% in women (House of Commons Library, 2012: 6).  
 Figures from public health groups identify a permissive consensus on further alcohol 
controls (Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2010; Bauld et al, 2013; compare with 
Greenaway, 2008a: 495 on ‘the libertarian nature of public opinion’), but opinion is 
divided on specific measures such as a minimum unit price of alcohol (YouGov, 
2012a; 2012b). 
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What is the Role of Ideas, Beliefs and Knowledge?   
The production and dissemination of the scientific evidence linking smoking to ill health has 
been accepted within government circles.  For example, a report by SCOTH (Scientific 
Committee on Tobacco and Health) in 1998 marked governmental acceptance of the 
scientific evidence on passive smoking (Cairney, 2007; Aspect Consortium, 2004: 34).  
The equivalent in alcohol policy is difficult to identify, and scientific evidence may play a 
longer term ‘enlightenment’ role than have a direct impact (Thom, 1999: 11-12). Further, the 
alcohol industry is still involved in the research process underpinning government policy 
through the ‘Portman Group’ and ‘Social Aspects Organisations’ (which exist partly to 
deliver voluntary measures) and by funding scientific research in a way no longer available to 
tobacco companies (Baggott, 2010: 140). Hawkins et al (2012: 301) find it ‘remarkable’ that 
‘current UK alcohol policies are far closer to policies advocated by the alcohol industry than 
those indicated by the prevailing evidence base’. The health debate continues with, for 
example, public health groups challenging the view that there is any beneficial level of 
alcohol consumption (Nutt, 2011; Møller, 2014) and seeking, in a field where it is relatively 
difficult to measure the risk and impact of consumption (Yeomans, 2013; Thom, 1999: 129-
30), to identify a mix of indicators of alcohol-related harm and convince policymakers of the 
need for further action (see for example, Bauld et al, 2013: 6-10; House of Commons Library, 
2012; Baggott, 2010: 135; 2011: 348-9; Plant and Plant 2006). 
The hope, within public health, of policy being driven primarily by the growing scientific 
evidence on alcohol-related harm has been frustrated. For example, the Home Office has 
been accused of ‘cherry picking evidence’ to generate support for the idea that late night sales 
licenses were beneficial to communities - by reducing anti-social behaviour at fixed times 
and reducing binge drinking associated with closing times at pubs (Baggott 2011: 424; 
Greenaway, 2008a: 491). Baggott (2010: 138) argues that the evidence suggested the 
opposite case, and that the policy came before the evidence. Further, while the policy was 
challenged significantly in media coverage and, to some extent, in Parliament, this related to 
‘moral panics’ about the social, not long term health, effects of ‘binge drinking’ (Baggott 
2011: 425; Greenaway 2008b: 9). Baggott (2010: 140) argues that this questionable link 
between public health group-led evidence and policy is still a general feature in alcohol. 
As in tobacco, it may be that the acceptance of alcohol-related evidence in governments can 
be accelerated by international organisations. However, the balance between public health 
and economic frames in EU policy seem more oriented towards public health in tobacco, but 
political economy in alcohol (Princen 2009; Baggott 2011: 360).  The WHO has played a 
strong postwar role and, by 2010, had developed a stronger global alcohol control strategy, 
informed by the ‘no safe level’ argument (Møller, 2014), but has not initiated an equivalent to 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Thom, 1999: 28-31; Baggott, 2011: 
359). The latter took approximately 25 years to develop after the WHO began to make 
pronouncements about tobacco (Cairney et al. 2012). The WHO has campaigned against 
alcohol hazards for an even longer time and, more recently, has recommended that the drinks 
industry be excluded from policymaking on this issue. However, it is more difficult to 
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develop an international consensus, particularly in countries with long histories of failed 
prohibition (Schrad 2010; the UK was not affected by prohibition but has been influenced by 
US research and policy - Greenaway 2003; Thom 2005; Berridge 2005b). 
Conclusion: The Broader Context of Evidence Based Policy 
The article situates the role of scientific evidence within a broad account of the policy 
process. It suggests that policymakers make choices within a policy environment consisting 
of five interacting processes involving institutions, agendas, networks, socioeconomic 
factors, and ideas/ beliefs. The nature of this policymaking environment influences the extent 
to which scientific evidence, and the solutions it helps generate, is accepted in government 
and used to produce a policy response that is consistent with the evidence. This process may 
take a remarkably long period of time. For example, we argue that, in leading tobacco control 
countries, it took 20-30 years to close the ‘evidence-policy gap’. 
We draw on this experience of tobacco control to suggest that alcohol control may only 
become as ‘comprehensive’ if some broad conditions are met: the department of health takes 
the lead on policy, at each level of government; the issue is framed dominantly as a public 
health problem requiring urgent attention; public health/ medical groups are consulted in 
government at the expense of the industry; the government does not value sales income and 
economic benefits over the broader socio-economic costs of consumption; public opinion is 
not against control measures; the evidence is accepted across departments in government; 
and, governments learn from the experience of others when introducing control measures.  
In other words, at least in politics, there is no such thing as self-evident truths that sweep old 
ideas aside. The process of turning evidence into policy is a battle like any other. In alcohol 
policy this is still to be waged in areas such as advertising and promotion, health warnings 
and education, and minimum unit pricing. Further, based on current evidence, and the 
experience of tobacco, it may take a long time, if ever, to be successful. 
References 
Advertising Standards Authority (2013) ‘Our History’ http://www.asa.org.uk/About-
ASA/Our-history.aspx 
AHRSE (Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England) (2004) London: Cabinet Office, 
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. 
Alcohol Concern (2010) ‘Review of Alcohol Taxation and Pricing’ (Submission to Treasury) 
http://www.alcoholconcern.org.uk/assets/files/PolicyandCampaigns/HMT_-
_alcohol_tax_and_price_review_August_2010.pdf  
Anderson, P. and Baumberg, B. (2006) Alcohol in Europe: A Public Health Perspective (A 
Report for the European Commission) http://ec.europa.eu/health-
eu/news_alcoholineurope_en.htm  
Aspect Consortium (2004) Tobacco or Health in the European Union – Past, Present and 
Future (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) 
http://www.europeancancerleagues.org/DOSS/uploaded/182_tobacco_fr_en[1].pdf 
13 
 
Baggott, R. (2005) ‘From Sickness to Health? Public Health in England’, Public Money & 
Management, 25, 4, 229-236. 
Baggott, R. (2006) Alcohol Strategy and the Drinks Industry: A Partnership for Prevention? 
York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Baggott, R. (2010) ‘A modern approach to an old problem? Alcohol policy and New Labour’, 
Policy and Politics, 38, 1, 135-52. 
Baggott, R. (2011) Public Health Policy and Politics 2
nd
 Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Bauld, L. et al (2013) Health First: An Evidence-based alcohol strategy for the UK (Stirling: 
University of Stirling) www.stir.ac.uk/management/about/social-marketing  
BBC News (2013) ‘Minimum pricing: Challenge to Scottish alcohol legislation fails’ 3 May 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-22394438  
Berridge, V. (2004) ‘Militants, Manufacturers, and Governments: Postwar Smoking Policy in 
the United Kingdom’, in E. A. Feldman and R. Bayer (eds) Unfiltered: Conflicts over 
Tobacco Policy and Public Health (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
Berridge, V. (2005a) ‘Issue Network versus Producer Network? ASH, the Tobacco Products 
Research Trust and UK Smoking Policy’. In V. Berridge (ed) Making Health Policy: 
Networks in Research and Policy after 1945. New York:  Rodopi. 
Berridge, V. (2005b) Temperance: Its History and Impact on Current and Future Alcohol 
Policy.  York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Berridge, V. (2013) Demons: our changing attitudes to alcohol, tobacco and drugs (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) 
Berridge, V. and K. Loughlin (2005) ‘Smoking and the New Health Education in Britain 
1950s–1970s’, American Journal of Public Health, 95(6): 956–94 
British Medical Journal (1967) ‘Road Safety Act, 1967’, 4, 39 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.4.5570.39  
British Medical Association (2008) Alcohol misuse: tackling the UK epidemic (London: 
BMA) http://www.dldocs.stir.ac.uk/documents/Alcoholmisuse.pdf  
Cairney, P. (2007) ‘A “Multiple Lenses” Approach to Policy Change: The Case of Tobacco 
Policy in the UK’, British Politics, 2(1): 45–68 
Cairney, P. (2012) Understanding Public Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave) 
Cairney, P. (2014) ‘If You Want to Inject More Science into Policymaking You Need To 
Know the Science of Policymaking’, paper to Political Studies Association Conference 
http://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2014/Cairney%20PSA%202014%
20EBPM%2028.2.14_0.pdf  
Cairney, P. and McGarvey, N. (2013) Scottish Politics 2
nd
 Ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave) 
Cairney, P., Studlar, D. and Mamudu, H. (2012) Global Tobacco Control: Power, Policy, 
Governance and Transfer (Basingstoke: Palgrave) 
14 
 
Cm 8386 (2012) The Government’s Alcohol Strategy (London: TSO) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98121/alcohol-
strategy.pdf  
Freeman, G. (1986) "National Styles and Policy Sectors:  Explaining  Structural Variation," 
Journal of Public Policy 5 (1985): 467-95. 
Greenaway, J. (1998) ‘Policy Learning and the Drink Question in Britain 1850-1950’, 
Political Studies, 46, 5, 903-18 
Greenaway, J. (2003) Drink and British Politics since 1830: A Study in Policy Making 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) 
Greenaway, J. (2008a) ‘Agendas, venues and alliances: New opportunities for the alcohol 
control movement in England’, Drugs: education, prevention and policy, 15, 5, 487-501 
Greenaway, J. (2008b) ‘The Politics of Drink: Research on New Labour and Alcohol 1997-
2005’, Paper for PAC Conference, York, September 
Greenaway, J. (2011) ‘How policy framing is as important as the policy content: The story of 
the English and Welsh Licensing Act 2003’, British Politics, 6, 4, 408-29 
Hastings, G et al (2010) ‘Failure of self regulation of UK alcohol advertising’, British 
Medical Journal, 340, 184-6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.b5650  
Hawkins, B. and Holden, C. (2013) ‘Framing the alcohol policy debate: industry actors and 
the regulation of the UK beverage alcohol market’, Critical Policy Studies, 7:1, 53-71 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2013.766023  
Hawkins, B., Holden, C. and McCambridge, J. (2012): Alcohol industry influence on UK 
alcohol policy: a new research agenda for public health’, Critical Public Health, 22:3, 297-
305 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09581596.2012.658027  
Holden, C. and Hawkins, B. (2012) ‘“Whisky gloss”: the alcohol industry, devolution and 
policy communities in Scotland’, Public Policy and Administration, 
http://ppa.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/07/26/0952076712452290.abstract 
House of Commons Library (2012) Statistics on Alcohol (SN/SG/3311) 
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn03311.pdf 
Institute of Alcohol Studies (2010) Public Opinion on Alcohol and Alcohol Policy 
http://www.ias.org.uk/resources/factsheets/public_opinion.pdf  
John, P. (2012) Analyzing Public Policy (London: Routledge) 
Joossens, L. and M. Raw (2011) ‘The Tobacco Control Scale 2010 in Europe’. Paper 
presented at European Conference on Tobacco or Health, Amsterdam. 
Levy, D.T., L. Currie, and L. Clancy. 2012. ‘Tobacco Control Policy in the UK: Blueprint for 
the Rest of Europe?’ European Journal of Public Health  
Lowi, T. (1964) ‘An American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory’, 
World Politics, 16, 4: 677–715. 
15 
 
McCambridge J, Hawkins B., Holden C. (2013) ‘Industry Use of Evidence to Influence 
Alcohol Policy: A Case Study of Submissions to the 2008 Scottish Government 
Consultation’, PLoS Med 10, 4, e1001431. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001431 
McCulloch, A. (2014) ‘Scottish Minimum Alcohol Pricing and EU Law’ 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394018  
Møller, L. (2014) ‘EU has 'highest' level of alcohol use and related harm’, The Parliament 
http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/eu-has-highest-level-of-
alcohol-use-and-related-harm/#.UxngLsZFCUl  
Nicholls, J. (2009) The Politics of Alcohol (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
Nutt, D. (2011) ‘There is no such thing as a safe level of alcohol consumption’, The 
Guardian, 7
th
 March http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2011/mar/07/safe-level-alcohol-
consumption  
Oreskes, N. and Conway, E.M. (2010) Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists 
Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York: 
Bloomsbury Press). 
Plant, M. and Plant, M. (2006) Binge Britain: Alcohol and the National Response. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
PLoS Medicine Editors (2011) ‘Let's Be Straight Up about the Alcohol Industry’, PLoS Med 
8, 5,  e1001041. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001041 
Princen, S. (2007) ‘Advocacy Coalitions and the Internationalization of Public Health 
Policies’, Journal of Public Policy, 27, 1, 13-33. 
Princen, S. 2009. Agenda-Setting in the European Union. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Rogers, S. (2013) ‘Tax receipts since 1963’, The Guardian (Data Blog) 18 March 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/apr/25/tax-receipts-1963#data  
Schrad, M.L. 2010. The Political Power of Bad Ideas: Networks, Institutions, and the Global 
Prohibition Wave. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Scottish Government (2013) ‘Target for tobacco-free Scotland’ (News Release) 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2013/03/tobaccocontrol27032012  
Studlar, D. (2002) Tobacco Control: Comparative Politics in the United States and Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press) 
Studlar, D.T, Christensen, K. and Sitasari, A. (2011) “Tobacco Control in the EU-15: The 
Role of Member States and the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy 18 (5): 
728-745. 
Thom, B. (1999) Dealing With Drink (London: Free Association Books) 
Thom, B. (2005) ‘Who Makes Alcohol Policy: Science and Policy Networks’, in Making 
Health Policy: Networks in Research and Policy after 1945, ed. V. Berridge. New York: 
Rodopi. 
16 
 
Warner K. and Tam, J. (2012) ‘The impact of tobacco control research on policy: 20 years of 
progress’ Tobacco Control, 21, 2, 103-9 
WHO (2008) WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2008: The MPOWER Package 
(Geneva, Switzerland: WHO) 
Yeomans, H. (2013) ‘Blurred visions: experts, evidence and the promotion of moderate 
drinking’, The Sociological Review, 61, S2, 58-78 
YouGov (2012a) ‘Minimum price for alcohol’, March 30 
http://yougov.co.uk/news/2012/03/30/minimum-price-alcohol/   
YouGov (2012b) ‘Minimum Alcohol Pricing – are you happy to pay more?’ May 16 
http://yougov.co.uk/news/2012/05/16/minimum-alcohol-pricing-are-you-happy-pay-more/  
                                                 
i
 ‘Industry’ describes a range of groups from independent pubs and off-licenses to large hospitality chains and 
supermarkets (Baggott, 2010: 137-8) and there is often competition within that broad grouping (Greenaway, 
2008a: 493) 
ii
 Challenges to the government-industry relationship come primarily from internal tensions rather than 
government action. For example, there are tensions between pubs and supermarkets, in the context of an 
increasing concentration of production in multi-national companies (Hawkins et al, 2012: 300). This might 
threaten its unified lobbying stand on issues such as a minimum unit price of alcohol, since it may harm pubs 
the least and producers/ supermarkets the most. 
